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Abstract
Videogames differ from films, books, and other mainstream media both in their interactive
capabilities and in their affordances for gameplay. Interactivity and gameplay are closely related,
as interactivity is necessary for gameplay. Unfortunately, this close relationship has led many
videogame scholars to conflate these two concepts when discussing player experience. In this
paper, I argue that, when discussing emotional responses to videogames, gameplay and
interactivity should be understood as distinct concepts: gameplay involves both interactive and
non-interactive elements, and interactive works do not always involve gameplay. I propose that
there are significant drawbacks to overlooking this distinction, and that highlighting it is important
for understanding player experience, player emotion, and the ways videogames differ from other
entertainment media.
Keywords: interactivity, emotion, videogame, game, gameplay

INTERACTIVE WORKS AND GAMEPLAY EMOTIONS

3

Interactive Works and Gameplay Emotions
What makes videogames different from traditional media such as film or literature? Some
media scholars and industry professionals say the essential difference is interactivity. For example,
in her book on videogame emotions, Katherine Isbister states: "At their heart, [video]games differ
from other media in one fundamental way: they offer players the chance to influence outcomes
through their own efforts. With rare exception, this is not true of film, novels, or television" (2016,
p. 2). Similarly, Sara Cole states, "The critical difference between past media and the digital media
of computer/video games is the necessary action of the player, interactivity…" (2017, p. 35). This
view is echoed by Soren Johnson, lead designer of Civilization IV (Firaxis Games, 2005), who
writes, "Nothing defines video games more than player choice. Interactivity is what separates
games from static entertainment forms like film and literature…" (2013, p. 56).
These three writers all emphasize interactivity's status as the single, essential feature
differentiating videogames from other media. Yet videogames also differ from traditional media in
a second fundamental way: they are games. Film, novels, and television are not games.1 The
writers quoted above are presumably aware of interactive media that are not videogames, such as
"Choose Your Own Adventure" books. Why, then, do they highlight interactivity as the only major
difference between videogames and other media, rather than describing it as one of two major
differences? I propose that their language reflects a tendency, common in academic videogame
discourse, to conflate the concepts of gameplay and interactivity. They highlight interactivity as the

1

Arguably, some videogames are not games, and some traditional media are. I will address these

points later in the paper.
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one major difference because they think of these two concepts as roughly equivalent in the context
of videogames.
While no one positively states that gameplay and interactivity are fully identical concepts,
some scholars use the terms in ways that suggest practical equivalence or, at minimum, elide
important distinctions.2 Richard Rouse, for example, claims that "A game's gameplay is the degree
and nature of the interactivity that the game includes, i.e., how the player is able to interact with the
gameworld and how that gameworld reacts to the choices players make" (2001, p. xviii). Jesper
Juul's influential book Half-Real describes gameplay as "the pure interactivity of the game" (2005,
p. 19), and Juul's entry on "gameplay" in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Digital Media states,
"gameplay is typically used to describe the specific experience of interacting with the game" (2014,
p. 216). These types of sentiments are summarized by Lori Landay in her comprehensive overview
of the concept "interactivity" for The Routledge Handbook to Video Game Studies (2014). She
notes that for videogame scholars, "often interactivity is equated with the concept of gameplay"
(2014, p. 177). After providing several supporting examples, she concludes, "In practical terms,
interactivity in video games is what a player can do in them—the choices and action that comprise
gameplay" (2014, p. 182).
Some reflection, however, reveals that the concepts of gameplay and interactivity have
important differences. Although gameplay requires interactivity, there are several ways in which

2

Of course, there are also scholars who define gameplay without reference to interactivity, e.g.

Eskelinen (2004).
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works that are not games can be interactive.3 The world of fine art, for example, includes works
such as Daniel Rozin's dynamic installation Wooden Mirror (1999), in which a video camera
hidden in a wall-mounted array of square wooden tiles provides information to a computer, which
tilts the tiles so they present an apparent mirror image to viewers. Interactive works exist in popular
arts as well, such as concerts in which a singer leads the audience in a sing-along and theatrical
magic shows with audience participants. None of these interactive works, however, are games in
the ordinary-language sense.
Despite these examples, it is not surprising that gameplay and interactivity are sometimes
conflated, as several factors encourage this practice. First, since players must interact with
videogames to play them, all videogames must be interactive. Consequently, when discussing
videogames, scholars are discussing a group consisting entirely of interactive objects. Second,
people frequently discuss ways videogames differ from mainstream films and novels, which are
neither interactive nor games. Since videogames are interactive games, and other types of
mainstream entertainment are non-interactive non-games, gameplay and interactivity are easily
grouped together. Finally, videogames are the only type of interactive works that have achieved
success with a mass audience.4 Most people have not spent significant time engaging with

3

I use the term "works" rather than "artworks" to avoid any connotations of evaluation. On my

usage, "works" includes all instances of a medium or artform presented in an aesthetic context,
including physical objects (e.g., paintings) and performances (e.g., symphonies).
4

See discussion in Tavinor (2011). I refer to "interactive works" rather than "interactive media" to

exclude ubiquitous technologies such as the internet and smartphones, which are typically not
artworks.
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interactive works other than videogames. For those who have engaged with many types of
interactive art, there is a clearer distinction between interactivity and gameplay. For those who
have not, this distinction is less salient.
One might feel that conflating gameplay and interactivity is a small issue, especially when
discussing commercial entertainment media, given the relatively small percentage of films and
books that are interactive. Yet the costs of such conflation are not limited to ignoring such works,
especially when trying to understand players' emotional responses. Someone who conflates
gameplay and interactivity may be tempted to think of emotions caused by gameplay and emotions
caused by interactivity as identical categories, but, I argue these categories are quite different. To
make my case, I first describe a theory of emotion, based on the psychological literature. I then
characterize the concepts of gameplay and interactivity, and argue that when analyzing emotional
responses to videogames and other media, videogame scholars are best served by thinking of
interactivity as a feature of a work, and gameplay as a mental framework or attitude of the
audience. Finally, I highlight two benefits of my account in understanding player experience: it
allows recognition of important ways that interactivity elicits emotion outside of gameplay, which
is necessary to understanding many types of player experiences; and it encourages us to discuss
"game emotions" rather than "gameplay emotions", which helps us better understand which
emotions are actually unique to gameplay.
Before beginning, I'll make two comments on my methodology. First, given the history of
definitional disputes surrounding the concepts interactivity, game, and play, one might be skeptical
as to whether these terms can be clearly discussed in any way other than simply stipulating
reductive definitions. But note that my goal here is not to come up with a definitive description of
these concepts appropriate for all contexts and purposes; I discuss these concepts in the specific
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context of understanding emotional responses to videogames. And even within this context, I don't
aim to provide definitions for these terms and defend them against all counterexamples and
alternate definitions. My more modest goal is to identify broadly-agreed-upon features of each of
these concepts within the context of emotion only to demonstrate that, in this context, interactivity
and gameplay are importantly different.
Second, although I focus on understanding emotion, other research areas may be better
served by alternate notions of these concepts. For example, scholars sometimes conceive of terms
such as "game" or "play" in an expansive or figurative sense in order to draw illuminating
connections between ostensibly disparate fields. Malaby, for example, defines a game as "a
semibounded and socially legitimate domain of contrived contingency that generates interpretable
outcomes", but does so for the express purpose of investigating "how people socially construct
games" (2007, pp. 96–97). While Malaby aims to emphasize the complex social networks that
influence the experience of gameplay, I aim to take the complex experience of gameplay and make
nuanced distinctions that will allow better analysis of its component parts. Such analysis can help
explain why, intuitively, the emotional experience of engaging with videogames seems very
different from engaging with other types of works.

Emotions
One reason it is difficult to discuss emotional responses to videogames is the sheer variety
of videogames and the emotional responses they evoke. A less salient obstacle is the mismatch
between common responses to videogames and ordinary-language emotion terms. While
videogame players often feel easily-named emotions such as frustration, happiness, and suspense,
no common emotion label corresponds to "having fun by being frustrated" or "being uncertain of
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the reason your avatar's movement doesn't correspond to your button presses." Further, emotion
terms often exclude many related types of responses, such as longer-term "moods" and the
valenced associations often called "preferences." Researchers thus frequently refer to "affect"
rather than emotion, "affect" being a broad term that includes a broad range of valenced feelings
(Frijda & Scherer, 2009). For simplicity, I'll use the word "emotion" in a broad sense equivalent to
"affect." On this usage, people experience emotions and have emotional responses continually
whenever they are conscious and are responding to situations in ways that feel positive or negative.
Thus, on my use of the term, not only are borderline examples like "having fun" emotions, so are
reflex responses, moods, and preferences, so long as they are accompanied by valenced, subjective
feelings. While a narrower understanding might better reflect ordinary-language use of the term
"emotion", it would exclude many types of responses to videogames relevant to this discussion.
Although the definition of "emotion" has been historically contested, the following is a
standard view in psychology (Sander & Scherer, 2009; Scarantino, 2016). Theorists across the
methodological spectrum agree that emotions (understood in the broad sense outlined above) can
be described as bodily changes that are prompted by appraisals of situations based on one's goals
and concerns. The appraisals involved range widely in the cognitive complexity they require and in
their salience (in fact, people are unaware of most appraisals they make). The consequent bodily
changes include mental states (constituted by brain activity), including subjective feelings, and
behaviors or behavioral dispositions. Once this initial emotional response has begun, people
cognitively monitor and regulate their response, consciously or not (Robinson, 2005), and
components of the response (such as feelings or actions) become new aspects of the situation that
themselves can lead to emotional responses. In this way, emotional responses are recursive, acting
in a continuous feedback loop (Scherer, 2009).
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Consider a player who loses hours of videogame progress when his character is killed, and
the player then rage-quits by shutting off his computer. His response is prompted by a situation that
includes not only physical objects in the player's external environment, such as the computer, but
also more abstract objects such as the rules of the videogame. The situation also includes events,
such as the character dying in-game, and the player's internal environment, that is, aspects of his
own bodily and mental states. The player evaluates the situation of his character dying as counter
to his goals. He experiences physiological changes, some hidden, such as changes in heart rate, and
some visible, such as the action of turning off the computer. These changes are accompanied by a
subjective experience, the feeling of anger. During the process, the player monitors his emotional
response, and the response itself becomes a new part of the situation. For example, the player may
note his intense feelings and respond by worrying about whether he is overreacting to the situation.
Even this very simplified account highlights the immense complexity of emotional response, as
well as the multiple types of situational features that must be considered when theorizing about
such responses to videogame play.
Understanding the relationship between gameplay, interactivity, and player experience
requires the introduction of another concept: mental frameworks (or frames). Apter is one of
several scholars who have used a theory of mental frames to provide a general account for how
people experience and respond to reality (1991).5 Apter holds that human experience is structured

5

A commonly cited text in discussing "frames" in the context of game studies is sociologist Erving

Goffman's Frame Analysis (1974/1986) (Deterding, 2009). I use Apter rather than Goffman due to
the former's focus on the subjective phenomenology of experience, which is more suited to
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by phenomenological frames, which provide a context for experience, and cause people to
experience situations "in a particular kind of way" (1993, p. 28). He argues that these frames come
in pairs, and that people's emotional experiences often change as they switch from one frame to
another.6 For example, a sudden, loud crash may cause heart-pounding alarm (the situation
understood in a "potential danger" frame) until one discovers that it was caused by someone
dropping a tray (switch to a "harmless accident" frame) (Apter, 2007, p. 54). I propose that at least
some of these psychological frames provide appraisal criteria for evaluating situations, and these
criteria largely determine one's emotional response. Children may be scared when they are chased
by others if they frame the situation as a serious one, and appraise it based on possible danger, but
if they frame the situation as playful, the appraisal criteria change and the situation can generate
laughter.
This overview of emotional response, psychological frames, and appraisal criteria
establishes the categories which underlie my argument about gameplay and interactivity. Emotions
are appraisals of situations, and frames provide appraisal criteria for situations. Thus, one might
categorize emotions by either the type of situation generating the emotion or by the framework
being used to appraise a given situation. My argument, in short, is that when discussing videogame
emotions, interactivity is best understood primarily as a type of situation, which can be appraised
using several different frames, each with different appraisal criteria. In contrast, gameplay is best

discussing the experience of emotion, as opposed to the latter's focus on social behavior, which
may be better suited to understanding emotional expression.
6

Although I rely on aspects of Apter's theory, my argument neither endorses nor relies on Apter's

theory in all its details or conclusions.

INTERACTIVE WORKS AND GAMEPLAY EMOTIONS

11

understood as one type of cognitive frame, which can be active in both interactive and noninteractive situations.7 Conflating these concepts is thus a sort of category mistake. To justify these
claims, I now turn to characterizing gameplay and interactivity more specifically.

Gameplay
In one sense, the meaning of "gameplay" is obvious: it is the activity of playing a game.
Gameplay is one type of play, and calling something gameplay serves to distinguish it from many
other kinds of play, such as playing "house", play-fighting, or playfully flirting. Play, broadly, has
been described as a state in which actions are marked off from ordinary life (Bateson, 1955;
Caillois, 1958/2001; Huizinga, 1949). Psychologists using frame analysis frequently describe play
as a frame people use to interpret their experiences (Apter & Kerr, 1991; Goffman, 1974/1986).
One of the primary frame pairs Apter discusses is "serious-playful."8 In a serious frame, actions are
taken to achieve long-term goals, while in a playful frame, actions are taken primarily for their
present enjoyment (1991, p. 16). Real fighting, then, is done for the purpose of injuring your
opponent, while play fighting is done just for the excitement of the activity itself.
How is a gameplay frame different from the frames used for other types of play?
Answering this question requires addressing what "game" means. There is skepticism about
defining the term "game," in part due to Wittgenstein's well-known use of games as a paradigmatic

7

Although others have argued that we should think of gameplay as a situation, they are addressing

research questions other than emotion; e.g. Eskelinen (2001) focuses on basic ontological issues,
and Upton (2017) aims to explain good game design.
8

Apter calls the "serious" and "playful" frames telic and paratelic.
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example of a concept that cannot be defined (1958, p. 36c). Yet in the context of trying to
differentiate emotional responses to various media, "game" can be sufficiently characterized. At
minimum, a game is a constructed system that invites players to take actions, according to rules, to
achieve a goal.9 As I will argue, these features are relevant to emotion in that they are central to
players' situational appraisals. This characterization of "game" is consistent with the best formal
definition of game, by Suits (1978/2014), as well as definitions of game by Juul (2005) and Salen
and Zimmerman (2004), which are the most popular definitions of games in games studies
(Stenros, 2017). Perron's (2003) discussion of French and Anglophone scholars also concludes that,
in English, the term "play" generally refers to free play, while the term "game" refers to a mode of
play "defining itself by rules that order its course" (2003, p. 241). While my characterization of
"game" is, for some purposes, overbroad, it is sufficient to provide some basic criteria for
gameplay that still allow us to differentiate it from interactivity, and thus to understand the
consequences of conflating the two concepts.
Many games scholars (e.g. Fullerton, 2014), following Suits, say that playing a game
requires a certain state of mind: a "lusory attitude" (1978/2014, p. 35) in which players assent to
follow the rules of the game in order to achieve the game goals. At first glance, this attitude may
seem to require (in Apter's (2007) terms) a serious frame, in which actions are goal-oriented, rather
than enjoyed in themselves. Apter acknowledges, however, that playful activities often have a goal.
What distinguishes serious situations from playful situations with goals is that in playful situations,
the goal is adopted merely for the sake of enjoying the activity, rather than as a useful end in itself

9

I present these as minimal features of a game, not sufficient criteria. A more comprehensive

description might include criteria such as artificiality, voluntariness, or inefficiency.
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(1991, p. 16). Thus, casual basketball players want to put the ball in the basket not as part of any
long-term life plan, but just to allow them to enjoy playing the game of basketball. If putting the
ball in the basket is part of a long-term plan, as might be the case for a professional basketball
player whose salary depends on his success in doing so, then the player is likely to approach the
task in a serious frame of mind, not a playful one (Kerr, 1988).
To see that gameplay involves a certain attitude or mental frame, and not just visible
behaviors, imagine that two actors are shooting a fiction film about chess. As part of the script,
they move chess pieces on a chess board in a predetermined manner. Even if their moves are
identical to moves they might have made while playing chess before the shooting began, while
shooting, they are not playing chess, because they do not have the mental intentions appropriate to
gameplay. They are not perceiving the situation through a gameplay framework; their pieces are
film props, not opportunities for victory. Playing chess requires certain mental states, such as
evaluating the outcomes of possible moves or appraising whether a game state is likely to lead to
victory or defeat. Gameplay, then, is not simply interacting with a game, it is interacting with a
game in accordance with its invitation to act, as its rules allow, to achieve some goal.
This example shows why it is essential not to confuse or to conflate players' mental
attitudes with their behaviors. While it is the case that behaviors may be caused by and may reflect
a particular mental attitude, it is also the case that one behavior may be caused by more than one
mental attitude. Just because people engage in the behaviors normally associated with playing
chess does not mean they are playing chess.
Finally, while a gameplay frame requires some sort of situation to which the frame can be
applied, given the variety of situations in which games can be played (with pieces vs. without
pieces, players physically proximate vs. distant, simultaneous action vs. turn-taking, solo vs.
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multiplayer), saying that someone is playing a game tells us almost nothing about their situation.
For this reason, gameplay is best understood as a mental framework or attitude rather than a type of
situation.

Interactivity
Aarseth's (1997) critique of the term "interactivity" is sometimes cited as evidence that the
concept is hopelessly elusive.10 Others, such as Manovich (2002) and Crawford (1984), have
warned against using the term without qualification due to its breadth of possible meanings. Yet
there are drawbacks to simply avoiding it, since, as Landay notes, "despite misuse and contested
definition, interactivity continues to be essential in video game studies" (2014, p. 174). Fortunately,
as I will argue, interactivity can be usefully characterized, and doing so is actually essential to
understanding the experience of playing videogames.
The concept of interactivity is murky enough to have prompted no less than five literature
reviews aiming to clarify it, each analyzing dozens of characterizations of the concept (Bucy, 2004;
Downes & McMillan, 2000; Jensen, 1998; Landay, 2014; McMillan, 2002).11 These discussions
agree on two points: there are several types of interactivity, and the term's meaning is highly
context-dependent, particularly when moving between academic disciplines.
As a first step in narrowing the concepts' scope, I follow a recommendation by authors of
three of the reviews (Bucy, 2004; Downes & McMillan, 2000; Jensen, 1998) that scholars reserve
use of the term "interactivity" for situations involving mediating technology, which excludes

10

See Tavinor (2009) for a persuasive response to Aarseth's position.
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Eichner (2014, p. 3) cites three additional literature reviews of "Interactivity" in German.
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ordinary in-person communication. Absent such a restriction, any form of communication or multiparty engagement would be considered interactive, and the concept would lose its usefulness in
understanding media engagement specifically.
A second restriction involves the sense of interactivity as communication. Advocates of this
view, such as Rafaeli (1988), tend to describe interactivity as the exchange of messages between
people. But Landay (2014) notes that in new media studies, communication is more broadly
conceived as including information exchanges between a person and a machine, and Bucy argues
that "interactivity should not be considered synonymous with social interaction" lest it be used too
broadly (2004, p. 375). Both Landay and Bucy note that when using new media, a person can
perceive the interaction as a two-party interaction even if only one actual person is involved (e.g.,
when "talking" with computer-controlled characters). Further, many videogame experiences are
single-player. Since player experience is my focus, there is no reason to limit use of "interactivity"
to situations with more than one person. I thus agree with Bucy's recommendation that interactivity
include (but not be limited to) "impersonal interactions with media content or nonhuman agents"
(2004, p. 375).
Within these two restrictions, several notions of interactivity remain. One that can be
quickly dismissed as overly broad requires nothing other than use of an electronic interface.
"Interactive" was an adjective applied in earlier decades to technologies such as CD-ROMs and
websites.12 But the present concern regards stand-alone works designed for audience
engagement—i.e., things like films, books, and videogames—not computer interfaces broadly.

12

For example, Saltz (1997) describes CD-ROMs as interactive. See Lopes (2001) and Smuts

(2009) for a critique of this usage.

INTERACTIVE WORKS AND GAMEPLAY EMOTIONS

16

Two main notions of interactivity remain. On the first, the concept of interactivity operates
to emphasize people's activity, rather than passivity, when engaging with works. In response to the
Frankfurt School critique that media audiences are often passive subjects, scholars such as John
Fiske have argued that, to the contrary, audiences actively construct culture through engagement
with media (Gorton, 2009). Along other lines, literary theorists such as semiotician Roland Barthes
(1975) and reception theorist Wolfgang Iser (1980) emphasize the reader's role in constructing the
meaning of a text, which, they argue, is created through the reader's interaction with the text. Film
scholar David Bordwell (1985) points out that audiences must actively engage in mental processes
such as inference and temporal reordering in order to understand narrative. In videogame studies,
Salen and Zimmerman define four levels of interactivity, and the first level, "cognitive interactivity
or interpretive participation" corresponds to the view that mental processes alone can constitute
interactivity (2004, p. 59).
Based on these lines of thought, some scholars endorse the view that interactivity refers to
the way that audiences necessarily engage with works in active manner, and interpret works using
their individual cultural history. It is this tradition that leads to claims such as "All classical, and
even more so modern art, was already 'interactive' in a number of ways" (Manovich, 2002, p. 71).
The notion that audiences are not just passive vessels into which meanings are poured has been
central to a more accurate understanding of the complex nature of reception. This insight is crucial,
for example, in understanding why individuals and social groups can respond differently to the
same work. But this view is not appropriate for the current topic, because it fails to distinguish
between videogames and traditional media. Those who conflate interactivity and gameplay
frequently do so in the context of distinguishing between videogames and other media. They are
not using the term to indicate a general activity on the part of the audience. In the present
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discussion, interactivity must be understood in a way that reflects the intuition that player
experience of videogames is significantly different from that of traditional media.
What remains is a notion of interactivity most appropriate to understanding players'
emotional responses to videogames: interactive works are those that invite audiences to engage
with them in ways that change the presentation of the works' perceptible elements (e.g., images and
sounds). Stated differently, interactive works invite the audience to change the work's form and/or
content.13 On this view, videogames are interactive because the player's actions influence the
sequential presentation of the videogame: what images are displayed, what sounds are generated,
and the timing and sequencing of the presented images and sounds. In contrast, most films and
books are not interactive in this way because, regardless of what happens in the minds of their
viewers and readers, the form or content of those works—that is, a film's images and sounds, or a
book's written words—will be unchanged.
An early example of this notion in the context of artworks is Ettinger's description of
"computer art" that has "interactional properties": "this kind of art is not passively experienced but
can be manipulated by an audience in simple or complex ways" (1991, p. 26). Starting in the late
1990s, numerous scholars describe the concept in similar ways. Jensen (1998) states
"…interactivity may be defined as: a measure of a media's potential ability to let the user exert an
influence on the content and/or form of the mediated communication" (p. 201). Two prominent
philosophers of art defend similar definitions of "interactivity", albeit in the terms of their

13

Regarding videogames, the claim is not that players change what a videogame can potentially

show during gameplay (i.e., that they change its underlying programming). I claim that players
change what is displayed, moment-to-moment, as they play.
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discipline (e.g., "just in case" rather than "only in cases where").14 Lopes (2009) argues, "A work
of art is interactive just in case it prescribes that the actions of its users help generate its display"
(p. 36), and Gaut (2010) argues "…a work is interactive just in case it authorises that its audience’s
actions partly determine its instances and their features" (p. 144).
In terms of the model of emotional response described above, interactive works differ from
non-interactive works in that they present audiences with a type of situational object that noninteractive works don't: namely, the audience's authorized actions that affect the work's features.
For example, consider Ann, who plays a videogame, and Bob, who later watches a recording of
Ann's screen during her play. Although Ann's and Bob's screens both present the same images and
sounds, Ann engages with an interactive work, while Bob engages with a non-interactive work.
Ann and Bob are not merely looking at a similar situation through different frames. Ann's situation
includes things absent from Bob's situation, including Ann's gameplay actions. When Ann presses
a button, her character jumps. Bob later sees the same character jump, but his situation does not
include the action of him pressing a button.
The distinction between situations and mental frames is important because interactive
situations offer the potential for audience actions, which can act as stimuli for types of emotional
response not available, in some cases, in non-interactive situations. Self-conscious emotions such
as pride, shame, and guilt, often rely on a sense of responsibility tied to action (Lewis, 2016). Noninteractive works rarely generate self-conscious emotions like pride because the audience

14
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ordinarily is not responsible for any of the work's features.15 Ann and Bob will both experience the
result of Ann's button press, but only Ann will experience it as the result of her own actions. Thus,
if the button was pressed at the right time, Ann might respond to the consequent videogame events
with pride, while Bob, who did not create any part of the work, should not.
The absence of authorized audience actions in non-interactive works, and the consequent
differences in emotional response, supports the notion that we should consider engagement with
interactive works to be a type of situation distinct from non-interactive works. This absence also
helps explain the intuition that playing videogames is a very different activity from engaging with
traditional mainstream works.
The claim that interactivity is best understood as a feature of a work does not imply that
there is no such thing as an interactive mental frame, nor does it suggest that the perception of
interactivity is irrelevant to emotional response. A situation is not experienced as interactive unless
a person views it as one in which they have an opportunity to change the form or content of a work,
which does require a certain mental attitude. And, as both Laurel (1993) and Landay (2014) note,
the actual interactivity of a work has no impact if the work is not perceived as interactive by the
audience. But, crucially, a mental frame interpreting a work as interactive is a broad frame that
does not imply any assessment criteria. A player sees a game as an opportunity for interaction, but
the assessment criteria come not from perceiving an opportunity for interaction per se, but from

15

By "pride" I mean pride about some feature of the work. I grant that non-interactive works might

generate vicarious pride about a work's features (e.g., if one's friend created the work), or they
might generate other types of pride associatively (e.g., propaganda films may generate pride in
one's national heritage).
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perceiving the situation as a game with goals the player would like to achieve. The situation of
gameplay generates player emotion based on players' appraisals of whether a particular game state
helps or harms their chance to achieve game goals, and those appraisal criteria are tied to the game
frame, not the interactivity of the situation.

Interactive, Non-Gameplay Emotions
Looking at interactivity primarily as situational feature, and gameplay primarily as
interpretive framework, has numerous benefits for better understanding of emotional response to
videogames. First, it highlights the significance of emotional responses to interactive situations that
are not based on gameplay. Although Deterding (2009) suggests that we should think of videogame
play as structured by a general "video game frame," an emotion-based approach suggests different
frames for each set of criteria used in appraisal and emotional response. Perron (2005) has utilized
Tan's (1996) account of film emotions to suggest that in addition to game emotions, videogames
create fiction emotions and artifact (i.e., aesthetic) emotions. [author_blinded] (XXXX), along
similar lines, discusses emotions created by artifact and narrative frames. An artifact frame implies
appraisal criteria relevant to evaluating artworks. For example, in The Legend of Zelda: Breath of
the Wild (Nintendo, 2017; hereafter Breath of the Wild), players can choose to change the color of
their horse's mane, with no effect on gameplay. Players appraise the outcome of their color choice
according to whether their actions helped them meet their aesthetic goals, not their game goals. A
narrative frame implies appraisal criteria relating to whether a situation is good or bad for the
characters in the story (including, potentially, the player-character). Consider a highly narrative
game such as the point-and-click adventure Grim Fandango (LucasArts, 1998). The player may
feel sympathy for the player-character when the character's boss criticizes his job performance.
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Such sympathy is based on an appraisal of the situation in terms of the character's fictional mental
states, not the player's game goals.
Theorists who conflate interactivity and gameplay might have difficulty explaining certain
types of player response. Consider Järvinen (2008), who provides one of the most sophisticated
accounts of videogame emotions to date. Like the writers quoted in the introduction to this paper,
Järvinen states that engaging with videogames is different from "other forms of
entertainment…due to the interactive nature of gameplay" (2008, p. 88). Accordingly, after noting
that "games impose goals on players," he describes player emotions as valenced appraisals of
situations that players face "in trying to attain those goals" (2008, p. 86). Thus, on his account,
players' positive or negative emotions can be explained by whether they appraise the game state as
helping or hindering their achievement of game goals. Since Järvinen sees player emotion as
centrally caused by gameplay appraisal criteria, on his view, "aesthetic stimuli" such as "flashy
graphics" do not cause emotions directly, but in a supplementary fashion based on the ways that
they provide gameplay information: "Such stimuli have a role in communicating and amplifying
the meaning of game states and game sequences…" (2008, p. 96). Yet his assumption that
interactive engagement is equivalent to gameplay, and thus that a gameplay frame must be central
to player emotions, can make it difficult for him to account for many player responses. Such an
approach cannot explain, for example, why players might be delighted or dismayed at how their
horse in Breath of the Wild looks with a purple mane, since mane color is completely irrelevant to
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achievement of game goals.16 In contrast, my account suggests that a player's pride can be
explained as their appraisal of their activities using a not a gameplay frame, but an aesthetic frame
in which actions are judged by the aesthetic success of the outcome. A case of emotions that
contrast with game goals makes the significance of non-gameplay appraisal frames even clearer. At
the end of Grim Fandango, a scene narratively portrays the sad end of a character relationship, but
also highlights the happy achievement of game goals. Players' negative or mixed emotions during
this situation suggest that mental frames other than gameplay affect players' emotional responses.

Game Emotions vs. Gameplay Emotions
A second benefit of distinguishing between gameplay and interactivity is a more accurate
analysis of game-related emotions, which, I argue, should be referred to not as "gameplay
emotions", but as "game emotions." In contrast, Perron has argued that games scholars should talk
about "gameplay" emotions rather than "game emotions" because the latter suggests that the
emotions are produced by the game itself, which obscures the fact that the emotions are part of
player experience (2011, pp. 145–146). I am less concerned about this potential confusion,
especially in discussions that clearly center on player experience. Consider what the descriptor
"gameplay" or "game" implies. Perron distinguishes between "fiction emotions, which are rooted in
the fictional world with the concerns addressed by that world," and "gameplay emotions…which
arise from the actions of the gamer in the game world" (2011, pp. 7–8). The problem with this

16

Järvinen does claim that aesthetic stimuli can also "be used as design drivers to

remediate…emotional potential" (2008, p. 96), but does not explain how remediation can lead to
emotional elicitation.
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distinction is that what determines a player's emotional response to a videogame at a particular
moment is the mental frame used to appraise the videogame situation, and the appraisal criteria that
frame implies. Yet while "fiction emotions" matches such an approach, "gameplay emotions" fails
to. Viewing a videogame situation as a fictional world implies the appraisal criteria used to
evaluate characters, such as moral criteria about whether the player wants good or bad things to
happen to the character. In contrast, Perron defines gameplay emotions as emotions following from
player game actions. However, as argued above, what makes a situation a game is not the actions
players take, but the mental framework used to appraise such actions. And the appraisal criteria
used to evaluate a game situation are whether the situation helps or hinders one's goals for the
game's outcome.
Yet, even if Perron's (2011) definition of gameplay emotions fails to match an appraisalbased account of emotions generally, why refer to game emotions rather than gameplay emotions?
The answer is that game emotions occur in both interactive and non-interactive situations. A
gameplay situation must allow interactivity, because games necessarily let players make moves. I
argue above that situations in which audiences engage with interactive works generate emotions in
those audiences using mental frames other than a gameplay frame. In this sense, interactivity is a
broader concept than gameplay. Yet, in another sense, a game frame is broader than interactivity,
because this frame is used in both interactive and non-interactive situations. Consider two people
playing Super Smash Bros. Melee (Nintendo, 2001), a one-on-one fighting game. After a tough
match, the victor may feel emotions of happiness, relief, and pride. Theorists who think of
interactivity and gameplay as essentially interchangeable might be tempted to attribute these
emotions to the player's gameplay and thus to think of these as interactive emotions. Yet if the
match takes place at a tournament, the victor's friends might feel happiness and relief at the victory
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as well, despite the fact that they are not playing the game. To extend the example, an audience
watching a film about a fictional Super Smash Bros. Melee player might also feel happiness and
relief at the player's climactic victory, despite the non-interactive nature of the work they are
viewing. Yet if film viewers can appraise fictional situations using a game framework, and their
positive emotions are the result of appraising the situation as matching their desire that a character
win the game, then it is a mistake to think that game-based emotions in an audience member are
necessarily a consequence of that audience member's interactive activity. This example
demonstrates that emotions sometimes attributed to a work's interactive features, or to the
gameplay activities of a player, may in fact not require that the people feeling those emotions
actually be playing the game. Further, recognizing that a game framework applies in noninteractive situations can help researchers isolate emotions that may, in fact, require one's own
actions, such as positive emotions associated with improving one's skills. Returning to Perron,
talking about gameplay emotions has a clear drawback in that it implies that the game-related
emotions generated while playing a game are always attributable to the interactive activity of
gameplay, but as this example shows, the implication is false.

Conclusion
There has historically been "passionate debate" about whether videogame research should
consider videogames as extensions of games or narrative (Frasca, 2003, p. 221). Scholars also
debate the degree to which videogames overlap with the world of fine art (e.g., Sharp, 2015). These
debates continue because videogames are hybrid objects, combining features of games with
features of other types of representational works. One reason it is so difficult to generalize about
player responses to videogames are that, as hybrid objects, videogames combine features of games
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and artworks in different proportions. Compounding this difficulty is the fact that people play
videogames in a wide variety of styles, with varying purposes, in diverse situations. As I argue
above, part of the solution is to make some important distinctions more salient when analyzing
videogames, and, when appropriate for particular research domains, to use terms in more specific
ways. In terms of studying emotional responses to videogames, scholars could focus less on
whether videogames are extensions of games, narrative, or fine art, and more on answering specific
research questions, such as why some commercial videogames generate similar emotions as films,
based on certain appraisal frameworks, but different emotions than art games, based on other
appraisal frameworks.
Conflating gameplay and interactivity has several unfortunate consequences. In terms of
interactivity, it encourages researchers to ignore aspects of interactivity other than gameplay. For
example, in The Art of Failure, Juul (2013) argues that "there are two types of failure in
[video]games: real failure occurs when a player invests time into playing a game and fails; fictional
failure is what befalls the character(s) in the fictional game world" (p. 25). Here, Juul overlooks
other types of failure that players might experience when engaging with a videogame through nongame frameworks, including interactive frames such as an aesthetic frame. Returning to the Breath
of the Wild example, a player who picks an ugly mane color for their horse (according to whatever
aesthetic criteria the player has) might be embarrassed at their failure to make the horse more
attractive. This is not an example of what Juul calls "fictional failure," since the failure was in the
player, not the player-character. And it is not what Juul calls "real failure," since the player hasn't
failed at the game aspects of Breath of the Wild. It is an artistic failure, based on appraising a
situation through an aesthetic frame, and interactive engagement with works can include other
frames as well.
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Conflating gameplay and interactivity also encourages videogame scholars to think about
emotions based on game goals as interactive emotions or gameplay emotions, when they are betterserved thinking of them as game emotions that include both interactive and non-interactive aspects.
The "game emotions" label allows a better understanding of both the similar and the distinct
emotional responses among videogame players and non-playing spectators.
Finally, going forward, a shift in use of these terms may provide ontological and
epistemological benefits for videogame studies. Since interactive works exist that are not
videogames, differentiating interactivity and gameplay can be useful for identifying such works,
which include computer art and works in virtual reality whose categories are still being created.
Also, consider works that are culturally characterized as videogames, such as SimCity (Maxis,
1989), but do not have explicit goals. Salen and Zimmerman argue that, in this way, SimCity "is
more like a toy than a game" (2004, p. 82). There are many videogames like SimCity that may not
strictly qualify as games. Differentiating gameplay and interactivity helps us contrast the
experience of playing these videogames from others that are unambiguously games. Ideally,
scholars can continue to move past the concern of whether videogames are more like games or
stories, into more nuanced discussions of degrees of interactivity, ways that game emotions are
generated by both interactive and non-interactive works, and how different types of hybrid objects,
such as interactive computer art, art games, interactive narratives, and digital virtual reality
experiences, can be understood to generate emotions in either common or unique ways.
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